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Abstract 
 
 
This study provides insight into how two national arts organisations located in London 
manage their performance in the pursuit of heterogeneous objectives, within the confines of 
external influences. These organisations significantly rely on the government for funding and 
are therefore required to implement policy initiatives, albeit at arm’s length from the 
government. Performance management systems (PMSs) were primarily designed to enable 
trustees discharge their statutory duties of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and 
works of arts, which were reflected in a management agreement containing the government’s 
strategic priorities.  The findings show that the changing politico-economic climate has subtly 
started to change values, accountability relationships and realities in the field of arts and 
culture. Whilst arts organisations emphasised socio-cultural objectives in strategic planning 
and operational processes, external pressures arising from austerity has subtly started to 
displace socio-cultural values. Business language, vocabularies, and tools commonly used in 
the private sector are insidiously taking roots in arts organisations. Austerity provided a signal 
to executives that the survival of their core activities was at stake and, they have to engage in 
income generating activities to support their core activities.  
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1. Introduction 
Arts organisations play an important role in the implementation of the politico-economic and 
socio-cultural priorities of governments in civilised societies (Foucault, 2009). As such, in 
many countries they are primarily funded from public funding which in turn creates 
accountability expectations from governments who have to demonstrate value for money (ter 
Bogt & Tillema, 2016; Zan, Baraldi, Ferri, Lusiani, & Mariani, 2012). In line with the new 
public management (NPM) ideology of distancing government’s political decisions from 
service delivery (Hood, 1995), national arts organisations in the UK are organised as non-
departmental public bodies (NDPB) to enable them carry out activities at arm’s length from 
the government, although they are accountable for implementing policy initiatives.  
Private sector management practices have been introduced in the arts sector, under the 
banner of NPM because of the perceived superiority of market-based economic principles 
(Hellstrom & Lapsley, 2016; Hood, 1995). However, prior studies have found that the 
imposition of economic rationality and the act of measuring or managing of the arts by 
numbers can have real, and often perverse, consequences, such as short-termism - the disposal 
of major heritage assets and collections leading to a loss in cultural value (Ellwood & 
Greenwood, 2016),   and focussing on getting done what gets measured  (Crepaz, Huber, & 
Scheytt, 2016). Whilst performance management systems (PMSs) aim to provide 
rationalisation in the form of justification of actions and make explicit means-ends 
relationships, there may be frustration when implementing PMSs in practice  (Townley, 
Cooper, & Oakes, 2003), because of differences in language, translation, interpretation and 
fit with existing culture, leading to divergence and sedimentation (Ferri & Zan, 2014; 
Hyndman, et al., 2014).  Moreover, the adoption of context specific strategies by different 
types of organisations may lead to different configurations, implementations, and usages of 
PMSs (Quattrone & Hopper, 2005).  
This study examines how national arts organisations manage their performance in the 
pursuit of heterogenous objectives, within the confines of external influences. It highlights 
the power of structures, pressures and constraints in influencing organisational practices and 
values. It draws on Ferreira & Otley’s (2009) extended framework for performance 
management and adds external influences discussed in the critical accounting literature 
(Jeacle & Miller, 2016; Oakes , Townley, & Cooper, 1998; ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016) to frame 
our analysis of external pressures and constraints influencing performance management 
practices. It makes a theoretical contribution to the functional (Chenhall, 2003) and 
descriptive (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Otley, 1999) methodological approaches adopted in prior 
performance management studies, by adopting a critical methodology which is helpful in 
providing insights into interests that underlie relationships (Broadbent, 2002).  
At the empirical level, this study illustrates how a PMS in a hybrid public sector and 
charity setting operates, highlights the power of governance technologies (e.g. management 
agreement with the government, strategic and business plans, and performance reporting) in 
transcending organisational and departmental boundaries to shape values, and discusses some 
of the implications of austerity in arts sector. This study is mainly based on data collected 
from published sources and interviews conducted with senior executives of a national 
museum and a national arts gallery located in London. These two arts organisations “are 
important centres for scholarship and research, as well as being hugely popular visitor 
attractions”, and are ranked in the top 10  leading visitor attractions in the UK (ALVA, 2016; 
HM Government, 2016, p. 2).  
This paper is organised as follows. The next section draws on the performance 
management literature to provide a framework for grounding the empirical analysis of 
performance management practices in arts organisations. The third section explains this 
study’s research methods. The fourth section presents the empirical findings in relation to the 
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PMS discussed in the second section. The final section provides some discussion and 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The performance management of arts organisations 
The pervasive use of private sector management practices in arts organisations has prompted 
researchers to suggest that these practices have colonised the lifeworlds of arts and culture 
(Oakes & Oakes, 2016). For example, the deployment of investment appraisal techniques 
(Mikes & Morhart, 2017), business planning models (Oakes , et al., 1998) and economic value 
measurement systems (Ellwood & Greenwood, 2016) makes certain things visible and others 
less visible although the latter may be as important, if not more important. This section 
provides an overview of private sector performance management techniques which may be 
used to manage arts organisations and draws on the critical literature to highlight the issues 
that are specifically relevant to managing arts organisations to provide a framework for 
analysing our findings. 
The balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2001), which links financial (i.e. 
shareholder) to non-financial performance perspectives (i.e. customer, internal business 
processes, and learning and innovation) in terms of cause and effect, has been universally 
applied in private, public and not for profit sectors to clarify, communicate and manage 
strategies. In a report commissioned by the Arts Council England, Royce (2011) argued that 
an arts organisation should have a sound business model, similar to the balanced scorecard to 
be successful beyond the short term. More specifically, “it must be attractive to a range of co-
investors (funders, donors, customers/visitors, staff, artists and other arts organisations); it 
must be agile: able to innovate and both to initiate and respond to change, in strategic and 
thoughtful fashion; it must be able to achieve its goals and to execute its strategy in cost-
efficient and effective ways; and it must also be well-led, well-managed and have a strong 
and appropriate organisational culture, which aligns and supports its mission and values” (pp. 
14-15). However, the relevance of this proposed PMS may be questioned because it primarily 
focuses on economic rationality and internal processes and is unable to effectively explain 
complexities and vested interests that underlie strategic planning and implementation 
processes (Norreklit, 2000). Even if performance can be defined from the perspectives of 
relevant stakeholders, the causality between performance measures and results may be 
difficult to ascertain in some sectors because of opacities, uncertainties and flaws (Dambrin 
& Robson, 2011).  
Contingency theory suggests that there is no universal PMS that can fit all organisations. 
According to Donaldson (2001, p. 1), the “essence of the contingency theory paradigm is that 
organizational effectiveness results from fitting characteristics of the organization, such as its 
structure, to contingencies that reflect the situation of the organization”. To improve 
performance, organisations are motivated to continually change (their structure and strategies) 
in response to changes in their contingencies to obtain an optimal fit. The major independent 
variables in the external environment and within the organisational boundary that were found 
to have a relationship with the dependent variables of performance include culture, 
competition, technology, uncertainties, organisational size, structure, strategy and 
compensation (Chenhall, 2003; Otley, 2016). In a comprehensive review of the contingency 
theory literature, Otley (2016, p. 45) interestingly commented that “all research on these 
topics has to take a ‘contingency’ approach as it becomes recognized that universal solutions 
to problems in organizational control generally do not exist”. However, Otley (2016, p.45 & 
48) found that most contingency studies have neglected qualitative non-financial variables, 
and as such he cautions that the adoption of a functional and “mechanistic approach that will 
develop into a predictive mechanism for the design of optimal control systems is misguided” 
and recommends future studies to deploy “a much wider range of research approaches”. That 
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is, the modelling, systematic measuring and testing of correlations and causality among 
performance variables by the inclusion of control variables, similar to controlled observations 
and experimentations carried out in the natural sciences, may not be appropriate in settings 
where they are complex influences, uncertainties and uncontrollable variables that are 
difficult to quantify. 
Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 263) developed an extended PMS by elaborating on and 
adding to the performance perspectives in Otley’s (1999) to provide “a research tool for 
describing the structure and operation of performance management systems (PMSs) in a more 
holistic manner”.  However, Ferreira and Otley (2009, p. 267) acknowledge that they have 
not included external contextual factors, which they view “as contingent variables that might 
explain why certain patterns of control are more or less effective, rather than characteristics 
of the control system that need to be incorporated into a description.” Neely, Adams, and 
Kennerley (2002) provide complementary insights into the role of external influence. They 
suggest that organisations are more likely to prosper and survive in the long term if they adopt 
a stakeholder centred approach when designing PMSs. They propose a comprehensive and 
integrated performance management prism that requires managers to think about 
stakeholders’ expectations (who are the stakeholders and what do they want and need?), and 
stakeholders’ contributions’ (what does the organisation want and need from its 
stakeholders?).  
Core dimensions of performance (i.e.  mission and vision, structure, critical success 
factors, strategic planning and implementation, performance measurement and evaluation, 
and consequences) are of primary concern to members working within the organisation’s 
boundary (Otley, 1999) – See figure 1. The vision statement is expected to succinctly and 
inspirationally clarify where an organisation wants to be in the future, whilst the mission 
statement is expected to explain why and for what purposes an organisation exists and how it 
intends to progress towards achieving its vision. Critical success factors are the activities that 
an organisation is expected to carry out and are the pre-requisites for progressing towards the 
achievement of organisational vision (De Vasconcellos, Sousa, & Hambrick, 1989). 
Information flows from internal and external sources form the basis for performance 
evaluation. The information flows may lead to change in strategic objectives and directions, 
depending on whether they are being used as single loop learning (i.e. treating objectives and 
strategies as fixed or given) or double loop learning (i.e. changing objectives and strategies in 
response to internal and external stimulus). Ferreira and Otley (2009) included the dimensions 
of PMS use and change, and coherence and intensity of relationships to provide a second level 
of analysis, because they pervade across the core performance dimensions at the centre of the 
diagram. The interactive use of PMS  to discuss strategic and operational issues and the 
diagnostic  use of PMS to trouble-shoot problems may lead to fine-tuning, refinements and 
changes of the core performance dimensions (Simons, 1995). 
Figure 1 adds external influences that are relevant for understanding performance 
management of arts organisations (Ellwood & Greenwood, 2016; Jeacle & Miller, 2016; 
Oakes & Oakes, 2016; Oakes , et al., 1998; ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016; Townley, et al., 2003). 
The purpose of this skeletal framework (Laughlin, 1995) is to illustrate the interests that are 
embedded in PMSs of arts organisations when pursuing politico-economic and socio-cultural 
objectives. As Oakes , et al. (1998, p. 277) found, the conception of PMS as “mere acts of 
technical transcription concealed the force this process involved” in directing “attention away 
from the shifting of cultural capital toward economic capital and the diminution of existing 
identities”. The autonomy of an organisation to pursue strategic actions, and its ability to 
define boundaries within a particular field depend on the economic, social, and cultural 
capitals that it possesses (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). 
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Figure 1: A performance management framework for arts organisations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Feedback & feedforward learning loops: information flows and interactions. 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Chenhall (2003); Ferreira and Otley (2009); Kaplan and Norton (2001); Neely, 
et al. (2002) 
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Prior critical accounting studies have provided insights into the influences that drive socio-
cultural and politico-economic objectives of arts organisations  (Ellwood & Greenwood, 
2016; Zan, Blackstock, Cerutti, & Mayer, 2000) and highlighted the “challenges in managing 
the arts, in particular the delicate balancing of the possible tensions between creativity and 
economic constraint” (Jeacle & Miller, 2016, p. 1). In the context of arts organisations in 
Alberta, Oakes , et al. (1998, p. 258) consider the discourses of “power as central to 
understanding how control works in modern society and organizations”. These authors argue 
that organisational planning and control systems provide sanctions to legitimise influential 
discourses (of managers and their external constituents), and serve as a mechanism for 
producing pedagogical knowledge and understanding of an organisation and its activities.  
The adoption of private sector calculative practices in the arts sector may have real 
consequences, beyond the phenomena being measured or valued (Hines, 1988) because the 
act of adoption has the potential to significantly influence core values and identities (Oakes , 
et al., 1998). Whilst accounting technologies provide the conceptual tools for decision making 
(such as recognising the economic reality of a transaction, an activity or an asset), they only 
paint a partial picture that matters for a particular purpose and from a particular perspective 
e.g. decision usefulness for investors, in contrast to accountability for future generations. For 
example, Oakes and Oakes (2016) found that the lifeworld of arts organisations which were 
mainly funded by Arts Council England was partly corrupted by accounting and commercial 
values. Managers were apparently aware of the inadequacy of numbers in capturing the full 
value of arts but nevertheless “played out the charade of advocacy and legitimacy, claiming 
to demonstrate impact when they knew the essence of the arts is always out of reach” (p. 50). 
They call for future studies to “develop further understanding of the management of austerity 
and funding constraints in arts organisations” (p. 50).  
Ellwood and Greenwood (2016) examined the challenges and consequences of the 
attempt by government and accounting standard setters to pressure arts organisations to 
recognise the economic value of their heritage assets. Arts organisations resisted pressures to 
place economic values on their collections because the determination of economic value is 
fraught with ambiguities, the measurement and preservation of economic value may result in 
the disposal of historically and culturally significant collections, and recognition of assets 
paints a picture of affluence which may affect funding from potential donors.  
In contrast, Mikes and Morhart (2017, p. 67) argued that accounting can play a 
catalysing role by “transforming a niche cultural project into a commercially viable popular 
culture product, while enhancing – rather than violating – the project’s artistic authenticity.” 
In the context of the Netherlands, ter Bogt and Tillema (2016) found that accounting fostered 
trust between theatres and the municipalities and mediated the tensions between conflicting 
creativity and control objectives. They “show that, despite the formal picture set out in 
performance agreements and accounting documents, the control relationship between theatres 
and municipalities might appear to be very ‘loose’ and informal in practice.” (p. 6). They 
argue that trust and relational controls play an important role in complementing formal 
accounting controls in relationships, especially when organisations are faced with multiple 
objectives and when performance is difficult to define and measure.  
The next section explains how data has been collected and analysed for the purpose of 
this study. 
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3. Research methods  
This study draws on interviews conducted with participants involved in the PMS of a national 
museum and a national arts gallery located in London, and on information that are in the 
public domain.   
Prior to conducting interviews, we analysed documents from secondary sources to 
engage in informed and meaningful discussion with the interviewees. More specifically, we 
analysed Acts of Parliament and management agreements, because PMSs are expected to 
enable trustees and museum directors discharge their statutory duties and deliver on the 
government’s priorities specified in these documents  (Oakes , et al., 1998). We also analysed 
the strategic plans, annual reports, key performance indicators, and minutes of meetings to 
understand how trustees and executives respond to external influences. When analysing these 
documents, we paid particular attention to issues pertaining to: socio-cultural and politico-
economic themes and priorities, governance structures, and accountability relationships. We 
also visited the museum and arts gallery prior to conducting the interviews to understand the 
socio-cultural activities they undertake, collections they have on display, and commercial and 
non-commercial facilities they provide to visitors. 
A total of twenty-one face-to-face interviews were conducted with trustees and 
executive directors who had substantial experience and knowledge of performance 
management issues and challenges facing the arts sector. These individuals were passionate 
about the world of arts and cultural policies, and played an important role in balancing socio-
cultural imperatives and politico-economic constraints (Oakes & Oakes, 2016; ter Bogt & 
Tillema, 2016). Sixteen interviews were conducted with trustees and executive directors from 
the two arts organisations – the contact details of these interviewees were available in the 
minutes of meetings of the arts organisations which are publicly available on their webpages.   
Five interviews were conducted with directors from the Department for Digital, Culture, 
Media & Sport (DCMS) and non-government sponsors – the contact details of these 
interviewees were provided by the trustees and executive directors of the arts organisations 
who regularly interacted with them.  
The core dimensions of performance, challenges posed by austerity, and responses to 
pressures were discursively apprehended during the interviews which were semi-structured 
in nature (Townley, et al., 2003). The following questions were asked guide the interviews: 
What are the objectives of your organisation? What are the roles of the trustees and executives 
and how do they interface with relevant interest groups? How is performance managed? By 
who, through what processes, and what areas are particularly emphasised? How effective are 
performance management processes and measures in terms of achieving objectives? What 
constraints, pressures and challenges does your organisation face, and how does it respond to 
them?  
To enable candid replies, interviewees were informed that their names would not be 
disclosed when writing the findings, but were cautioned that the name of the organisation may 
be identifiable as this study also uses information in their annual reports and strategic plans 
which are in the public domain. They were also informed they could withdraw from the 
interview process at any time and, make any comment off the record. All interviewees 
consented in writing to participate in the study, verbally consented to be recorded, and did not 
express concern that the name of their organisation may be identified. The interviews lasted 
between 60 and 90 minutes. The recordings were immediately transcribed by one of the 
researchers after the interviews to enable accurate recall of issues discussed (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The transcripts were also checked for accuracy by another researcher. 
All the transcripts were read and analysed in relation to themes that have been 
highlighted in the performance management literature, discourses in policy and regulatory 
documents, corporate plans and annual reports, to identify pertinent and contentious issues 
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and to frame this study’s findings. This process requires reflexivity and acknowledgement of 
the researchers’ own interests (e.g. arising from the choice of a particular paradigm or 
theoretical framework) and position they occupy in the intellectual field (Bourdieu & 
Wacquant, 1992; Said, 1994) – i.e. in the communication of a particular reality, we may be 
complicit in constructing that reality (Hines, 1988). The objective of this study is not to 
generalise, but to provide insights into performance management issues and challenges faced 
by the two arts organisations studied which may resonate with experiences in other settings 
(Berry & Otley, 2004).  
 
 
4. Findings: The performance management of arts organisations 
The findings are presented in relation to the inter-related dimensions of performance 
discussed in the literature. External influences are discussed first, as these drive performance 
management processes within arts organisations. 
 
External structural influences driving organisational objectives 
Both the museum and the arts gallery are well established organisations – they were officially 
opened in the mid and late nineteenth century respectively. Their governance structure, within 
which they pursue their socio-cultural and politico-economic objectives, is quite complex. 
Although they are organised as non-departmental public body (NDPB) to enable their 
executives carry out activities at arm’s length from the government, they contribute towards 
the performance objectives of DCMS in return for the public funding they receive. They are 
also exempt charities under Schedule 3 of the Charities Act 2011, meaning that the DCMS is 
their principal regulator for charity law purposes. This regulatory framework partly drives the 
mission, objectives and activities, as stated in the annual report of the museum: “During 2016–
17 the Board of Trustees of the Science Museum (the SMG Board) agreed a new vision and 
mission for SMG…which takes due regard of the Charity Commission’s general guidance on 
public benefit and informs all decision-making, future planning and strategic priorities” 
(National Audit Office, 2017, p. 5).  
The statutory duties of the trustees are specified in the National Heritage Act 1983 and 
the Museums and Galleries Act 1992, which state that they are responsible to: (a) care for, 
preserve and add to the works of arts in their collection; (b) secure the works of arts exhibited 
to the public; (c) make the works of arts and documents available to persons seeking to inspect 
them in connection with study or research; and (d) generally promote the public’s enjoyment 
and understanding of arts. The trustees are also politically accountable to the ministers (from 
DCMS and the Cabinet Office) who are responsible for appointing them on the board of 
national museums and arts galleries, although “the recruitment of Trustees takes place in 
accordance with the procedures defined by DCMS and the Office of the Commissioner for 
Public Appointments” (National Audit Office, 2017, p. 41). The government controls the 
criteria for making senior appointments, such as the desirability of candidates possessing 
specialised knowledge about arts, culture, history and collections, and commercial knowledge 
about fundraising, and income generation, and thus indirectly plays a role in embedding 
values at the strategic level in arts organisations. 
The arts organisations engaged in fundraising and commercial activities to supplement 
their funding from government and charitable sources, which may create conflict among 
objectives. Table 1 shows their funding structure in 2007 and 2017, and highlights the impact 
of the government’s austerity agenda that began in 2010. Although government funding for 
the museum has increased in nominal terms from £37m to £41, a director of finance from the 
museum explained that this has declined in real terms and that the rate of increase in their 
unavoidable costs, which are mostly fixed, was greater than the rate of inflation:   
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Government funding has fallen by more than 25% in real terms between 2010 and now, 
and next year it will fall. Our funding was cut for 2015-16. So we would have to find 
additional funding to make up the difference or cut expenditure to reflect that. We are 
an organisation that has very high fixed costs - all of these buildings to maintain and 
collections to look after. Lots of our costs are unavoidable. Costs have gone up far 
faster than the rate of inflation, and yet our funding is falling. 
 
Table 1: Sources of funding 
 Museum Arts gallery 
 2007 2017 2007 2017 
 £000 % £000 % £000 % £000 % 
Government (DCMS) 36,697  75% 40,934 59%  7,031  44% 6,637 35% 
Non-government:         
   Donations  5,258  11% 6,125 9%  2,788  17% 4,213 22% 
   Charitable income  747  2% 10,865 16%  2,622  16% 4,250 22% 
   Trading & investment  3,376  7% 9,783 14%  3,448  22% 3,803 20% 
   Other  2,741  6% 2,200 3%  138  1% 271 1% 
Total non-government 12,122 25% 28,973 41% 8,996 56% 12,537 65% 
Total income 48,819  100% 69,907 100% 16,027  100% 19,174 100% 
Source: Annual reports (2007 and 2017). 
 
The proportion of non-government funding as a percentage of total funding in 2007 to 2017 
has increased for both arts organisations, which can potentially change accountability 
relationships because reliance on funding is a source of influence (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016). 
It is interesting to note that interviewees from the arts gallery pointed out that they wanted 
greater control of the funds they raised from other sources - the total funding for the arts 
gallery was about 65%, as compared to the museum which was 41% in 2017. However, a 
principal curator from the museum highlighted that placing greater reliance on non-
government funding may influence the values of arts organisations: 
 
Donors have too many restrictions – we don’t want to touch them. If they want to get 
their names on the main hall, that is fine, but we don’t want to be driven by donors. I 
am very concerned if the government funding goes down, because we would have to 
heavily rely on the donors. This would then affect the political drivers and political 
culture of the museum. 
 
Whilst austerity has pressured arts organisations to raise income from non-government 
sources, the financial crisis has taken its toll on non-government funding. This has led to stiff 
competition among arts organisations from a declining pool of funding. As commented by a 
deputy CEO from the arts gallery:  
 
Winning donations from benefactors is an uphill struggle, even for the most adept of 
fundraisers. Charitable donations to arts and culture were down by about 20 per cent 
last year. 
 
In summary, PMSs are expected to enable arts organisations discharge their statutory duties 
and meet the accountability expectations of their funders and themselves. 
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Vision, mission, organisation, and critical success factors 
Arts organisations operate within the confines of statutory, government and economic 
influences. The vision and mission reflected their core values which were primarily geared 
towards the pursuit of socio-cultural objectives. For example, both organisations articulated 
their vision and mission in their annual reports and corporate plans as follows: ‘building a 
scientifically literate society’, ‘inspire next generations of scientists, inventors and engineers’, 
and ‘promote through the medium of portraits the appreciation and understanding of the men 
and women who have made and are making British history and culture’. Whilst interviewees 
were generally enthusiastic to talk about the socio-cultural objectives of their organisation, 
they highlighted that the pursuit of these objectives were influenced by resources and 
administrative constraints imposed by their funders.  
The mission and vision, which featured in official documents such as annual reports and 
strategic plans, played a pedagogic role in communicating the values of senior management 
(Oakes , et al., 1998).  They were aimed at enabling trustees discharge their statutory 
responsibilities, and enabling the museum director discharge her/his ‘personal accountability’ 
to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports (i.e. the minister in charge of DCMS) 
for safeguarding public funds.  A director of development from the museum explained the 
accountability structure as follows: 
 
Trustees and the chair of the board of trustees are appointed by DCMS. Our museum 
director who is the chief executive of the group, is appointed by the prime minister… I 
report to a finance and general purpose sub-committee of the board of trustees, and to 
the board of trustees on a quarterly basis on income. I attended these meetings to 
explain fund-raising performance, and compliance with ethics policy: who are we 
getting money from, why, and for what purpose? 
 
In return for the funding provided by DCMS, the chair of the board of trustee and museum 
director were required to sign a management agreement with the Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport. The Secretary of State explicitly highlighted her financial priorities 
for the arts organisation by stating that it should ‘continue to pursue commercial and 
philanthropic approaches to generating revenue which will complement grant-in aid’ but 
couched her socio-cultural priorities in broad terms by stating that it should ‘ensure that free 
entry to the permanent collections would be made available’, and ‘protect world-class 
collections and front-line services’ (DCMS, 2017a). 
Whilst the government’s socio-cultural priorities were loosely specified in the 
management agreement (i.e. one page), administrative matters were quite comprehensively 
covered (i.e. 30 pages). Financial and administrative matters relating to governance and 
performance that were covered in greater depth include: financial management, duties to 
deliver on the strategic priorities of DCMS, broad performance objectives of the arts 
organisation in relation to statues and the implementation of public policies, risk management 
and internal control procedures, procurement, accounting information to be disclosed and 
reported to DCMS, formal review meetings with DCMS, and responsibilities of the parties to 
the agreement.  
As compared to the formal relationship between arts organisations and the government, 
the relationship with non-government funders depended on the size of the funding and 
purpose for which funding was provided. The agreement ranged “from a strong legal contract 
with major corporate donors, to a purely verbal philanthropic agreement with trusts and 
foundations” (Director, arts gallery).  When undertaking projects, museum and the arts gallery 
met their non-government funders’ socio-cultural priorities whilst simultaneously fulfilling 
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their duties to DCMS. Project-specific success factors were identified for subsequent 
monitoring and evaluation.  As stated by the director of development from the museum: 
 
You have to set up project objectives for the project and meet sponsors’ priorities, but 
you have to meet the government’s priorities as well. Sponsors monitor the project quite 
closely; you will need to meet them very regularly. You would have to demonstrate that 
you have used the fund to meet objectives, and to evaluate achievement of objectives 
afterwards. 
 
In summary, the core values in the vision and mission of arts organisation, which provide the 
framework for strategic planning and reporting to relevant authorities, reflect the statutory 
duties of senior management.  
 
Strategic planning and implementation 
The long-term strategic and short-term business plans played a pedagogic role in terms of 
providing departments, teams and individuals with a planning and control tool that would 
subsequently be used to assess their contributions to organisational objectives (Oakes , et al., 
1998). In this respect, the chairman of board of trustees and the museum director stated that 
the strategic planning “document captures the top-level long-term priorities and is to be used 
actively as a touchstone for decision-making throughout the next decade or so” (Museum, 
2017, p. 38). 
Arts organisations distinguished between ‘core’ and ‘support’ values to differentiate the 
values that mattered most to them. Whilst both organisations placed significant emphasis on 
their socio-cultural objectives (e.g. inspire people, create knowledge, increase audience and 
sustain growth of collections) which they termed ‘core’ priorities, they also acknowledged the 
importance of ‘support’ priorities such as the generation of income. In response to funding 
pressures, the museum stated that by 2030 “it will be an exemplar among museums for 
commercial activity and entrepreneurship” (Museum, 2017, p. 36).  
The interviewees generally identified themselves with the socio-cultural values 
espoused in the management agreement, and in the strategic plans. However, they also 
acknowledged the importance of income generating activities in supporting core values, such 
as introducing special paid exhibits, new products or service, and trading in coffee and gift 
shops. For example, a director of public engagement from the museum broadly highlighted 
these values as follows: 
 
Our strategic plan reflects the history of the museum what we choose to focus and how 
we want to position the museum in the next ten years, how we want to be perceived by 
our stakeholders, the funding environment, and the needs of the stakeholders who 
provide us with funding in particular, but all these things are very much related. 
Fundamentally the strategic plan is a bold statement about who we are, why we matter, 
what we intend to do, but it is written with a view to securing funding for the 
organisation because we need to raise money to do what we want to do. 
 
The different components of the strategic plan were ‘owned’ by directors and their heads of 
departments, denoting segregation of duties and responsibilities in the pursuit of different, but 
related, objectives. For example, the curators were concerned with issues related to 
collections, whilst the directors of engagement were concerned with the profile of audience, 
and the commercial task force was interested in income generating activities. As explained by 
a director of public engagement from the art gallery: 
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The strategic plan for public engagement strategy group, which I chair and am 
responsible for, is written in collaboration with my heads of department and their staff.  
In practice, they will each ‘own’ different elements of the public engagement strategy. 
We will review each of those activities in order to understand what’s going on, whether 
we are performing in a way that we want to, etc. Ultimately, I then have to report that 
to the Executive Board who will then report to the trustees, and there is a whole suite 
of processes that are in place to enable us deliver those strategies.  For example, we 
have a ‘commercial task force’ that deals with commercial income, we have a ‘content 
strategy board’ that sets the content of the public programme, we have a ‘public 
engagement programme board’ that governs our projects.  
 
In contrast to the strategic plan which spanned a decade and articulated the board of trustees’ 
and the museum director’s strategic priorities, the arts organisations prepared an annual 
business plan to articulate the operational activities that departmental managers and 
individuals intend to undertake in the pursuit of long term objectives. Surprisingly, a chief 
curator used the cause-effect vocabulary in the balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 2001) 
as follows: “Every individual has a performance development plan, where personal objectives 
are informed by the departmental objectives and linked to the museum’s business plan for the 
next twelve months”. 
DCMS did not interfere with operational matters which were the responsibility of the 
executives. However, it was involved in making senior appointments and dealing with 
administrative and strategic matters through a ‘bureaucratic chain’. There was an element of 
trust between DCMS and the arts organisations (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016), as apprehended 
from our interview with a director of development from the museum:  
 
To a large extent, DCMS just let us get on with our work. They can directly contact our 
trustees if they have a problem regarding the things that we do. But they actually know 
what we are doing, because we articulate what we do clearly, we report to them every 
quarter, so there is a bureaucratic chain. To some extent there is an element of trust. 
Where they flex their muscle, is on the appointment of board of trustees and chairman. 
Regarding day to day operations, they are flexible. 
 
However, it would be naïve to think that DCMS does not indirectly influence operational 
activities. This is because the long-term strategic plan of the chairman of the board of trustees 
and the museum director which informs the operational matters in the annual business plans 
is itself based on the management agreement which focusses on the strategic priorities of the 
Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sports. As stated by the chairman and museum 
director in the strategic plan “the  priorities and goals in Inspiring Futures will be reflected in 
Annual Plans from 2017/18, which will set out specific actions and deliverables…This 
overarching strategic framework will also inform the subject-specific strategies and plans that 
are produced from time to time.” (Museum, 2017, p. 38).  
In summary, the management agreement, strategic framework, and business plans have 
penetrated the departmental boundaries of arts organisations to shape values of the different 
teams working to pursue common objectives. These documents contain private sector 
performance management vocabularies which have entrenched arts organisations. 
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Performance measurement, evaluation and consequences 
Performance was evaluated externally in relation to the management agreement signed by the 
board of trustees, the museum director and the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and 
Sports, and internally in relation to the annual plan and the strategic plan.  
The external monitoring process is aimed at enabling DCMS discharge its parliamentary 
accountability for using taxpayers’ money. DCMS provides official statistics of the arts 
organisations they sponsor and delegate the responsibility of compiling performance 
indicators to the chairman of the board of trustees and museum director who are required to 
follow the DCMS’s ‘Performance Indicator Guidance Document’ (DCMS, 2017b). However, 
a director of engagement from a museum argued that they should not be judged on the basis 
of generic KPIs: 
 
The KPIs are simplistic and don’t reflect our strengths as a scientific research institute 
– we have many scientists who produce scientific knowledge as compared to other 
museums who don’t. We are different, yet we are judged on the basis of generic KPIs, 
alongside others. 
 
However, the external KPIs were used symbolically to loosely manage performance. No 
targets were assigned and there were no financial consequences: The management agreement 
does not say: ‘we will give you x if you achieve y in terms of performance’ (Deputy CEO, arts 
gallery).   
The feedback loop from DCMS to the arts organisations was weak. As pointed out by 
a director of public engagement from the arts gallery: 
 
We sign the management agreement with DCMS at the beginning of every four years, 
telling us what the grant-in aid is going to be and what KPIs we must report on, but the 
document don’t ever get referred to again…The information just literally goes into a 
black hole and nobody sees it again. 
 
Some interviewees commented that lack of feedback was the result of downsizing of the 
museum team in DCMS which affected its ability to effectively engage with the arts 
organisations. As pointed out by a trustee: ‘DCMS itself was not spared from the funding 
cuts’. The UK government has reduced the number of key performance indicators (KPIs) from 
12 to 3 (i.e. visitor numbers, philanthropic income, and items on loans) to reduce the 
administrative burden of data collection and analysis (DCMS, 2017b), and in response to the 
widespread criticisms of the use of performance targets in the arts sector “which can act as 
millstones around the neck of creativity” (McMaster, 2008, p. 4).  
Unsurprisingly, interviewees highlighted that their internal KPIs were more helpful than 
DCMS’s generic KPIs. A director from the museum provided the following examples of 
qualitative issues they monitor using internal KPIs: “visitor satisfaction, number and quality 
of our publications, number of publications in top ranked journals, self-generated income, 
and number of scientist visiting and using our collection for research purposes”. However, 
he admitted that other factors such as “what visitors take away from the museum, in terms of 
understanding and inspiration to become scientist” are difficult to capture.  A bottom-up 
approach was followed when designing these KPIs i.e. they were discursively agreed by the 
departmental directors and their teams, tailored to capture heterogeneous objectives and 
critical success areas, and used diagnostically as traffic lights to signal progress towards 
achieving strategic objectives (Simons, 1995).   A director of finance and planning from the 
arts gallery explained that:  
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We use a range of KPIs, as in a traffic light system, to measure our progress, and what 
we hope to achieve, by way of activities. Our progress is not only measured against the 
KPIs, but is also measured against whether we deliver the things that we expected to 
deliver, and if we didn’t, why not? My reporting to the trustees is a combination of the 
KPIs and activities, which they find helpful. 
 
Evaluation processes not only created knowledge about activities and performance to enable 
the steering of organisational activities, but also enabled self-reflection and learning. As 
commented by a director of public engagement:  
 
We don’t set internal KPIs for the fun of it - I mean we really use them. I have about 
half a dozen KPIs for my public engagement strategy which I feel are fundamental for 
me to know how we are doing, and whether we are moving in the right direction.  For 
example, we segment our market into two or three segments and use a KPI to measure 
our engagement with the target audiences or segments. Currently we are engaging 31% 
with a particular segment but by 2018 we want to increase our engagement to 35%.  
That KPI is a meaningful measure which is linked to the objectives in our strategy 
document, such as fund raising or engagement with a minority group, or inspiring 
people.   
 
DCMS loosely monitored the performance of arts organisations at a distance, whilst tightly 
specifying the ground rules that arts organisations should follow to demonstrate value for 
money. Internal performance evaluation processes were praised for their emancipatory 
potential of enabling discrete organisational units evaluate the effectiveness of their activities 
when pursuing heterogeneous objectives.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
This study has provided insights into the complex influences that shape the PMSs of national 
arts organisations. PMSs were primarily designed to enable trustees discharge their statutory 
duties of collecting, preserving, and displaying objects and works of arts, which were reflected 
in the management agreement containing the government’s strategic priorities, such as 
fostering interest in science, technology engineering and mathematics (STEM), creating 
cohesion among the population and reaching specific groups such as ethnic minorities, women 
and young people (DCMS, 2017a). PMSs of arts organisations were also influenced by 
changes in political and economic climate, and reflected the efforts of trustees and executives 
at interpreting and responding to these changes in their strategic plans and operational 
activities. 
Dependence on funding is a major source of influence (ter Bogt & Tillema, 2016). In 
return for public funding, arts organisations are required to contribute to the strategic priorities 
of the Secretary of State of Culture, Media and Sports. The latter is politically accountable to 
the Cabinet Office and the Parliament for obtaining value for money in the pursuit of policy 
objectives. In line with the NPM ideology of distancing politicians from service delivery to 
make managers accountable for results (Hood, 1995), national arts organisations are organised 
as NDPBs to provide them with immunity from political interference. However, the 
government was able to obtain action at arm’s length through two main governance 
technologies which were hierarchical in nature: control over the appointment of trustees and 
museum directors, and the management agreement. DCMS was primarily concerned with 
financial reporting, policy priorities and administrative matters. Despite the financial and 
administrative focus aimed at increasing transparency, DCMS could not effectively assimilate 
the information produced by arts organisations and effectively engage with them because 
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DCMS itself was not spared from the funding cuts. This lack of feedback unsurprisingly 
created the impression that the information was going into a blackhole. Nevertheless, DCMS 
intervened to over-ride an important strategic decision taken by the museum’s executives to 
close one of its branches due to funding cuts and falling visitor numbers, because the political 
implication of the closure outweighed the financial implication.  
The findings illustrate the power of governance technologies in transcending 
organisational and departmental boundaries to shape values and create identities through 
learning and reflection. Whilst accounting technologies, such as PMSs and strategic plans, are 
designed to communicate a reality by rendering things visible, they have the potential to create 
a reality of the things that are most valued by influential groups. For example, management 
agreement drove the long-term strategic and short-term business plans and made ‘core’ and 
‘support’ strategic themes visible. These documents played a pedagogic role in creating 
knowledge to enable organisational steering and learning (Oakes , et al., 1998). Heads of 
departments and individuals identified with the themes and objectives inscribed in strategic 
and business plans, and aligned their operational activities to pursue the strategic themes 
emphasised by senior management.  
Generic KPIs have the tendency to standardise and homogenise. Whilst the 
appropriateness and usefulness of KPIs have been blanketly questioned in the literature 
(Oakes & Oakes, 2016), this study distinguishes between generic and specific KPIs and 
highlights the purposes they serve. Generic KPIs, which were reduced from 12 to 3, were 
symbolically used to demonstrate contributions of arts organisations to DCMS’s priorities, 
whilst providing autonomy to arts organisations to differentiate themselves. Generic KPIs 
were used because it is difficult to precisely define and measure the outputs and outcomes of 
different arts organisations by designing specific KPIs, which would have further hindered 
managerial discretion and increased administrative burdens. Interviewees devised their own 
specific KPIs to capture information of interest to them, but admitted that not all information 
can be captured by performance measures.  
The implications of austerity should be carefully assessed by the government, because 
of its potential to change accountability structures, displace socio-cultural values, and change 
identities. Austerity and the government’s funding cuts pressured arts organisations to find 
alternative sources of funding to support their core activities. Competition has intensified 
among arts organisations who are competing for the same pot of funding which has reduced. 
Interviewees highlighted that they are placing greater emphasis on fundraising and moving 
towards a US model of funding their activities through donations and commercial activities, 
although they are unable to charge for access to their general collections as part of the 
condition of the grant-in aid from DCMS. However, a significant increase in the proportion 
of non-government funding to total funding may require a reconfiguration of the current 
governance structure which prioritises accountability to the government.   
External pressures arising from austerity resulted in the emphasising of politico-
economic values and the subtle displacement of socio-cultural values, which may be 
counterproductive to the government’s own policy initiatives of, for example, widening 
citizens’ participation in the arts sector. The pursuit of market solutions to the problem of 
austerity may marginalise certain groups and change values, as arts organisations are tempted 
to attract visitors who are more likely to spend, put-up special exhibits for which visitors have 
to pay to gain access, use scarce space for commercial activities, and  cut costs by reducing 
the number of engagement projects they undertake (Oakes & Oakes, 2016). The focus on 
economic objectives (e.g. fundraising activities) may conflict with social-cultural objectives, 
in the deployment of scarce managerial time and space resources.  
External politico-economic pressures arising from austerity and the financial crisis 
helped to inculcate new vocabularies to reconfigure identities. The language, vocabularies, 
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and tools commonly used in the private sector (such as strategic and business plans containing 
mission, strategies, SMART goals, cause-effect relationships, profit, and income-generating 
activities) were insidiously taking root in the arts sector (Mikes & Morhart, 2017). Reliance 
was placed on private sector “external experts who advised, guided and challenged” arts 
organisations in the preparation of strategic and business plans that provide the overarching 
framework for governing arts and culture (Museum, 2017, p. 5). This strategic document, 
prepared by financial expert, created visibilities on strategic themes that formed the basis for 
operational action by executives and their teams. Austerity provided a signal to executives 
that they have to embrace these vocabularies to support their core activities, the survival of 
which were at stake. 
The government’s austerity discourse has brought changes that are subtly redefining the 
field of arts and culture. Arts organisations share some complicity in the process of changing 
their values by implementing externally imposed imperatives in the guise of austerity that 
may threaten the production of cultural goods. Managers were complicit in their own control, 
by accepting the government’s austerity agenda and adopting PMS modelled on the private 
sector to change their practices, identities and what they value in the field of arts. Whilst 
funding is required to support the pursuit of socio-cultural objectives, arts organisations do 
not necessarily have to engage in fundraising and commercial activities, which may become 
a core activity and an end in themselves, to support arts and culture if these are truly public 
good. 
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